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Abstract—While Cloud data services are a growing successful
business and computing paradigm, data privacy and security
are major concerns. One critical problem is to ensure that data
owners’ policies are honored, regardless of where the data is
physically stored and how often it is accessed, and modified. This
scenario calls for an important requirement to be satisfied. Data
should be managed in accordance to owners’ preferences, Cloud
providers service agreements, and the local regulations that may
apply. In this work we propose innovative policy enforcement
techniques for adaptive sharing of users’ outsourced data. We in-
troduce the notion of autonomous security-aware objects, that by
means of object-oriented programming techniques, encapsulate
sensitive resources and assure their protection. Our evaluation
demonstrates that our approach is effective.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing services enable individuals and organiza-
tions to outsource data management with ease and at low cost.
However, while Cloud data services are a growing successful
business and computing paradigm, data privacy and security
are major concerns. Data stored in the Cloud often encodes
sensitive information and should be protected as mandated
by organizational policies and legal regulations. A commonly
adopted approach is to encrypt the data when uploading them
to the Cloud. Encryption alone however is not sufficient as
often organizations have to access, modify and selectively
share data with other parties [13], [14]. Policies must be
associated with the data to specify which party can access
the data for performing which actions. Such policies can be
quite complex as they typically encode different access con-
straints. Furthermore, a Cloud secure data management system
should be able to demonstrate ongoing conformity with their
customer’s business compliance and regulatory requirements
(depending on industry and jurisdiction). Maintaining separate
compliance efforts for different regulations and standards in
an automated fashion is knowingly a major challenge in the
Cloud domain. Access restrictions for sensitive data have
to adapt not only to changes by the content originators (or
owners), but also to privacy and auditing regulations that are
in place in the location where data is stored and managed.
Furthermore, depending on the location, different architectures
and standards may affect data representation and management,
resulting in compatibility issues.
Toward addressing these issues, in this work we propose
innovative policy enforcement techniques for adaptive shar-
ing of users’ outsourced data. We introduce the notion of
autonomous security-aware objects (SAOs), that by means
of object-oriented programming techniques, encapsulate sen-
sitive resources and assure their protection. Such protection
is afforded through the provision of adaptive security policies
of various granularity. The resources protected by SAOs may
be files of different kind, including images, text, and media
content. The security policies can include constructs to specify
access control, authentication and usage controls. Furthermore,
they are enforced according to contextual criteria to ensure
compliance with location-specific regulations and service level
agreements. Through careful design and deployment, SAOs
provide strong security guarantees, and adapt to local com-
pliance requirements. As part of our solution, we show how
SAOs can either use locally pre-loaded policies or securely
accept new policies from trusted authorities.
We have implemented a running prototype of the proposed
approach using JavaTM-based technologies [1], [11]. We have
extensively tested our prototype, and used the Amazon Web
Services (AWS) APIs to demonstrate how our solution can be
integrated with actual CSPs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section
provides an overview of the notion of SAO. Section III
discusses the security policies and their enforcement. Section
IV presents the deployment of our architecture and discusses
the context retrieval process. Section V reports experimental
results. Section VI discusses related work and Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE SAO-BASED SOLUTION
A. Overview of Secure-Aware Objects
Any object-oriented approach designed to achieve adaptive
data protection has to address the following requirements: pro-
tection of encapsulated data through enforcement of security
policies associated with the data, interoperability, portabil-
ity, and object security. Our SAO-based approach addresses
the first requirement by provisioning owner-specified security
policies that are tightly bound with the content, and executable
within the SAO. To ensure interoperability, our SAOs are
self-contained, and do not require any dedicated software to
execute, other than the Java running environment. Precisely,
each SAO includes five key components: (1) authentication
and authorization tools; (2) self-enforcement policy engine;
(3) security policies in executable form; (4) secure connections
manager; and (5) protected file(s);978-3-901882-48-7 c© 2012 IFIP
140978-3-901882-48-7 c©2012 IFIP
Fig. 1. Overall Approach
Self-containment ensures portability, in that SAOs may be
moved and replicated without the need of installing dedicated
software. We employ nested Java Archives (JARs) [11] to
achieve both the portability of the protected content and the
portability of the modules required to access and use the
content as intended by its originator.
In order to guarantee adaptivity to the context from where
the content is accessed, the policies embedded in the SAO are
sensitive to the location and other contextual dimensions that
may affect the enforcement process.
Finally, object security is guaranteed by advanced crypto-
graphic primitives, such as Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based
Encryption [4] and Oblivious Hashing for program tracing [7],
combined with extended and advanced object-oriented coding
techniques. We leverage built-in Java constructs, like Java
policies and Java Authentication and Authorization Service
[1], to implement the object’s content protection mechanisms.
B. Interaction Flow
Our SAO-centered architecture deals with four different
classes of stakeholders, that is, data owners, government
authorities, cloud service providers (CSPs), and content con-
sumers. These entities are in charge of authoring policies
for the protected content, and/or accessing the content upon
need. In particular, government authorities issue regulations
concerning content sharing and protection, and require that
these regulations be enforced by organizations managing data;
whereas CSPs may enforce rules reflecting their terms of
service or to facilitate data processing. data owners may have
their own personal policies concerning the access and use of
their own content. Finally, content consumers access content,
their accesses must comply with all the access restrictions
imposed on the content by the other stakeholders.
In what follows, we assume that government authorities
and service providers are represented by a trusted third-party,
referred to as Policy Authority (PA), which is in charge of
storing high-level regulations and service level agreements,
and translate them in policy rules expressed in a machine
interpretable form. The generated policy rules can thus be
automatically enforced by a computer system.
Figure 1 shows the interplay among the four stakeholders
during generation and consumption of SAO. In detail, a SAO
is generated by a content originator subscribed to a CSP. The
generation of a SAO includes three major phases, reported on
top in the figure. The first phase is the specification by the
content originator of policy rules, for controlling the sensitive
content (e.g. text, video or image file) to be stored at the
CSP (step 1). The second phase is the specification by the
policy authorities of policy rules whose enforcement assures
compliance with security and data disclosure regulations (e.g.
auditing requirements), as well as with SLAs specified by
cloud service providers (step 2). The third phase is the
compilation of all these policy rules into executable policies.
The executable policies are then encrypted and sealed with the
content using CP-ABE primitives (step 3). After these three
phases, the generation of the SAO is completed.
Once created, the content stored in each SAO may be
accessed according to its security policy. SAO consumers may
include authorized users, CSPs for processing and analysis,
and auditors/authorities to meet compliance requirements.
Each time access to the SAO content is attempted, its policy
rules are evaluated for applicability, according to the requested
subject credentials, and contextual features (step 7).
The policy protecting the content stored within the SAO is
organized in rules of varying priority, and each rule may be
context-specific. As the SAO changes location, high-priority
rules may be added to the SAO, using a third-party invocation
protocol if the rules are not stored within the SAO already.
Specifically, each policy rules set generated by a local au-
thority is stored in a repository managed by the local PA, as
shown in steps 8 and 9 of Figure 1. The PA guarantees that
each policy rule contained in the set is within the scope of the
authority jurisdiction, and that it is applicable only for SAO
stored within the authority’s domain.
III. SAO POLICIES
In this section, we first introduce an abstract representation
of the security policies supported by our system. Next, we
discuss how these are translated within the SAO.
A. Policy Specification
We define a security policy as a collection of declarative
rules, i.e. P = {r1, . . . , rn}, n ≥ 1. Each rule controls access
and usage of a given content by a certain entity (e.g. user,
service provider, government authority). It may either target a
single content item f (e.g. file) stored within the SAO, or if
the SAO stores multiple content elements (i.e. files), it may
refer to all of them.
A rule r is a tuple composed by the following elements:
< PolicyL:Effect, Act, Subj, Obj, Location, Time >. Be-
sides the PolicyL : Effect, and the Obj, the remaining
components are defined in terms of boolean conditions against
a set of pre-defined variables. Boolean conditions take the form
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(a op a′), where a is the attribute name, a′ the attribute value,
and op is a basic atomic operator, such as >,<,=,≥, and
≤. We assume that boolean conditions are atomic. We briefly
discuss each component in what follows:
• PolicyL denotes the policy level and can take one of the
following values: Auth, CSP, or Owner; whereas Effect
is a boolean variable that represents an access Deny (0)
or a Grant (1). The PolicyL is assigned according to
the policy author, and it dictates rules’ hierarchical order.
Auth refers to rules specified by government authorities,
and take priority over rules defined by other parties. CSP
refers to rules that can be defined by CSPs for managing
the user’s content. This is a secondary priority level.
Owner denotes the lowest priority level and it is used
by data owners to control access of their own content.
• Act denotes the admitted action, and is therefore content-
specific. Act is instantiated if the rule effect is set to 1.
• Subj is the targeted entity. A subject can be identified by
means of a combination of one or more joint (disjoint)
boolean conditions against the attributes of the credential
used for authentication purposes at the SAO. For exam-
ple, if X.509 certificates are used, any condition against
any of the attributes included in the credential to qualify
the subject (e.g. Country, Name, and Age) can be used.
In addition, the policy author can constrain the class
of entities the rule applies to, by specifying a boolean
condition against a special Type attribute, if not supported
directly by the credential. This type refers to the entity
performing the access, which could be one of the three
stakeholders: Auth, CSP, or User. In particular, Auth
refers to (regulatory/legal) authorities, CSP refers to cloud
service providers, and User refers to end consumers.
• Obj refers to the target of the rule. It can refer to an
individual file within the SAO, or the whole object, in
which case Obj assumes the default value SAO.
• Location refers to conditions related to the location
of the data consumption. Location-based conditions can
refer to both geographical and cyber locations. They are
both expressed at various levels of granularity, from a
general country or state, to the specific machine where
the object can be executed. In the current version of our
policy language, locations can be specified using boolean
conditions against predefined attributes. Examples in-
clude Country, State, City, IPaddress. To ensure cor-
rect evaluation of location information, we request that if
City = NULL ∨ State = NULL, then Country = NULL.
• Time is used to represent any possible time constraints.
Temporal conditions are represented by means of finite
intervals [3] [tb, te], where tb and te denote the lower
and upper bound of the interval, respectively. Open ended
intervals are also supported (e.g. tb > 12/12/2014).
B. Policy Rules Selection and Translation
When a new SAO is created or a SAO is moved to a
new location, the policy composition and translation process
is activated. This process is executed so as to ensure that
only relevant and applicable rules are included in the SAO.
Simply storing all the rules in the SAO may be impractical
and not scalable. The policy translation process is preceded
by a selection of the applicable rules, followed by a static
ordering of applicability.
1) Policy rules selection: This first step identifies a set
of applicable rules. Applicable rules are identified using
current contextual information, without consideration of
the subject requirements, as if subject information were
not available at this point of time. Precisely, a policy rule
r =<PolicyL : Effect, Act, Subj, Obj, Location, Time>
is applicable to the current context c =<
Country, State, City, IP, Timestamp>, if and only if: (a)
the rule location conditions match the contextual information,
that is c.Country = r.Country or c.State = r.State or
c.City = r.City; (b) r refers to a file f witch matches or is
included in the Obj component of the rule, i.e. Obj = f or
Obj = SAO; (c) temporal restrictions are not obsolete, that is
Timestamp < r.Time.te.
Next, the applicable rules with highest priority are selected.
To ensure correctness of execution, the rules are organized
into classes according to the PolicyL values (i.e. Auth, CSP,
Owner). The obtained sorted list is then used to ensure a
deterministic order of evaluation of the policies, to be reflected
at the time of policy translation.
2) Policy rules translation: The sorted list of rules are
next translated into Java policies and access structures. Access
structures are defined according to the specification of the CP-
ABE encryption schema [4]. CP-ABE is in fact adopted as
it supports the notion of attribute-based policies as a criteria
for encryption, and is complementary to the Java policies.
The access structures are embedded as part of the encrypted
content, as by the CP-ABE construction. Which party is
entitled to decrypt the content and under which context is
addressed by means of the CP-ABE boolean access structure
entries. Conversely, the Java policies are stored in the data
container, i.e. the SAO, and specify which party can access
a specific resource (code, files), and how. For example, the
Java policies help render the content according to the specific
access privilege.
A local Trusted Authority (TA) connected with the PA
acts as key management authority, and is the only entity
which knows and manages the cryptographic key needed for
the encryption of data and the Master key needed for the
creation of CP-ABE decryption keys associated with the users.
We specifically employ the Encrypt(PK, T, f) primitive of
the CP-ABE protocol for encryption, where T is the access
structure representing attribute-based conditions (in terms of
conjunctions and disjunctions), f is the file being encrypted,
while PK is a set of public parameters.
T is implicitly contained in the ciphertext. T takes the form
of a directed and acyclic graph. Upon evaluation T is traversed
in depth, to ensure correct hierarchical ordering: the root node
is AUTH , and the node OWNER is last child node in the
subtree with root CSP.
IV. SAO DEPLOYMENT AND CONTEXT RETRIEVAL
Architecturally, a SAO includes three components: the Ap-
plication Section, the Content Section, and the Policy Section,
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wrapped into an external JAR.
Application Section: a set of unmodifiable software modules,
signed and sealed by the PA to ensure integrity of the appli-
cation. The Application Section is itself deployed in a nested
JAR, and organized into four components: Authentication and
Access Control Component (AAC), Action Control Compo-
nent (ACC), Content Protection Component (CPC), and the
Connection Manager Component (CMC).
The AAC implements the authentication and authoriza-
tion mechanisms, by exploiting the services offered by Java
Authentication and Authorization Services (JAAS) [1] and
Security Manager. By means of JAAS primitives, the SAO
accepts X.509 certificates.
The ACC implements mechanisms for managing access to
protected content, according to the outcome of the authentica-
tion and authorization process. This component accesses the
Java policy file, which dictates what portions of the code to
execute upon verification of identities and of authorization.
The CPC manages the protected content stored in the
Content Section, as well as the protocols to re-deploy the new
Content Section upon context change or time expiration. Con-
tent encryption and access control enforcement are integrated
by means of the CP-ABE scheme [4].
The CMC handles all processes for creating secure con-
nections toward the PA to receive the Content Section and
toward the WorldWide Space and Time Services to retrieve
the context information. The CMC component implements
a Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol and exploits
SSL connections to ensure private connections.
Content Section: stores the protected content items, the Java
policy file that records the policies implementing the security
rules, and an record with the last context in which the content
has been accessed. Both Java policy file and the last context
record are signed with the TA private key (TAPrivKey)
for integrity purposes. The Content Section represents the
dynamic part of the SAO since it replaced by the TA, each
time that the SAO is accessed in a new context or after a
certain time period, to ensure compliance with more recent
policy rules.
Policy Section: a collection of owner level policy rules, i.e.,
the set of policy rules specified by the data owner for the SAO.
This section is encrypted with the user SK, thus only the TA
is able to decrypt it.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Our evaluation testbed includes a client machine, a Mac
Book Pro (with a 2.2 GHz Intel Core i7 process, and 4
GB 1333MHz DDR3 memory); and a server machine, an
iMac (with a 3.06 GHz Core 2 Duo E8435 processor, and
8 GB 1333MHz DDR3 memory). The client machine acts as
a content consumer, whereas the server machine hosts the TA.
The client machine connects to the Amazon Web Services.
In particular, we have used Amazon S3, Amazon EC2 and
Amazon Cloud Drive for the storage and computing services.
We conducted several tests to evaluate the performance
of our architecture. First, we evaluated the total time of
reconstructing a SAO upon changing the context. We tested
the reconstruction time by varying both the size of the SAO,
and the size of the policy. We measured the size of the
SAO in KB, ranging from 25 to 1000, and we measured
the complexity of the policy in terms of size of the access
structure, which complexity is defined in terms of nodes in
the access structure. The time is not significantly affected by
the file size, while there is an increase upon augmenting the
size of the access structure. For a very complex policy, with
80 nodes, the reconstruction time is 2.6 seconds.
As a second experiment, we compared the delay in ac-
cessing a file with and without the SAO architecture. A file
encrypted with the CP-ABE scheme (access structure with 25
nodes) is decrypted in 0.68 seconds. If the file is hosted by the
SAO, the authentication, the context retrieval and the rendering
procedures, added to the file, bring the access time to 1.31
seconds. A change of context adds further 1.0784 seconds to
the earlier time, because in this case a communication and
data exchange with the TA is required.
VI. RELATED WORK
Access control [13], [15] and data management outsourcing
techniques targeting the Cloud have been recently proposed
[2], [6], [9]. Further, Cloud-specific cryptographic-based ap-
proaches for ensuring remote data integrity have been devel-
oped [14]. Subsequently, Wang and et al. [14] proposed a
data outsourcing protocol specific to the Cloud. Wang’s work
is focused on auditing of stored data from trusted parties.
The notion of SAO is corroborated by previous projects [8],
[5] and our own results [12], [10]. Our approaches are closely
related to self-defending objects (SDO) [5] and self-protecting
objects. SDOs are Java-based solutions for persistent pro-
tection to certain objects. SPOs are software components
hosted in federated databases. The objective of SDOs is to
ensure that all the policies related to any given object are
enforced irrespective of which distributed database the object
has been migrated to. SDOs depend on a Trusted Common
Core for authentication and authorization, and therefore are
not applicable in distributed systems. As a result, adap-
tiveness issues are not considered. Related to the idea of
self-protecting data is also the work on sticky polices [8]
that focuses on portability of disclosure policies by means
of declarative policies tightly coupled to sensitive data by
means of cryptographic algorithms. However, these policies
are designed for federated organizations, and therefore lack
adaptiveness to the domain of application. In previous work,
we proposed an approach for accountability [10] in the Cloud.
VII. CONCLUSION
We presented an approach for secure and distributed data
management in the Clouds. The idea behind our solution is to
protect the data by means of wrappers applied to the targeted
content file(s) which are “security-aware” in that they protect
the content as it travels across domains by locally enforcing
security policies. In the future, we plan to support more
articulated access rights and contexts.
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